News Centre

Good morning.

It is with a deep sense of gratitude that I’m able to provide this keynote speech today, and I want to acknowledge and sincerely thank the Community Security Group Victoria for your continued support for the AFP.

You’ll be happy to know that I touch on the matters you asked me to speak about today, so in advance to everyone in the room, my remarks today will heavily focus on national security, antisemitism and the broader criminal landscape.

I can see a number of our hard-working AFP members from Southern Command in the audience, and I acknowledge and thank them for being here today. 

Some of these members were directly involved in investigating the Adass Israel Synagogue arson attack in 2024, and have worked tirelessly to bring a number of individuals before the courts.

It is not unusual for the community to not know or be privy to all the work law enforcement does behind the scenes when a serious crime is committed.

And equally, not everyone will be aware of the critical work CSGs perform for the Jewish community and ultimately to the nation, so without any ambiguity I want to make it very clear – I value the civic duty you perform and so does the AFP. 

I know that you are courageous and dedicated, yet it can often feel like you are carrying the weight of your community’s expectations.

And I recognise that since December 14, that weight has only become heavier and more intense.

But I never want you to feel alone or that you are doing things in absence of others when it comes to protecting your community.

I acknowledge that at times the AFP can appear slightly removed from the public because of the different legislated roles and responsibilities held by us and state and territory law enforcement agencies.

However, as AFP Commissioner, I stand here with clarity and determination, to let all Australians know that we will not tolerate hate crimes or other offences that undermine community cohesion, our democracy or our national security.

I am deeply disappointed, frustrated and motivated to do more when I hear stories about those within the Jewish community, especially children, who have removed their Kippah or the Star of David because they fear being racially abused or worse.

Never, ever again, should anyone from the Jewish community feel they need to hide or strip away their identify just to stay safe.

As Commissioner, I have a laser-like focus on protecting Australia and how we live peacefully together. Australia’s way of life must be defended and safeguarded, especially for our children, who are our future.  

I have now been Commissioner for about 10 months and during that time, there has been a number of high-profile matters that have directly or indirectly required significant action from the AFP.

Significant law enforcement planning, resources and community reassurance have been needed for many of these operations, but none has come close to the aftermath of the deadly assault at Bondi Beach.

That atrocity has wounded our nation, and the scar will forever endure in our national psyche.

There has been, and remains a lot of noise, post the Bondi attack.

But for myself and the AFP, we are not distracted from the fact 15 innocent people were killed. The Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion continues its important work and the AFP looks forward to its final report.

Today, I want to lay down the draw bridge and bring you into my confidence. I want to give you some information from the inner sanctum and let you know what was going through my mind during the darkest day in Australia’s history in about 30 years.

On the day of December 14, I was in Vanuatu for official meetings relating to the national security challenges we are facing in the Pacific.

It was close to 7pm, when media were reporting a significant attack in Sydney, but the motivation was not immediately apparent.

By 7.21pm, when information became clearer, conversations were being held between myself and my office about getting me home as soon as possible.

Every second in Vanuatu felt as long as an hour. It was an excruciating wait to get to Australia. 

And while I was able to have initial conversations almost immediately with Prime Minister Albanese at our High Commission in Vanuatu about what we knew and what the next steps would be, as you could expect, the details were still scant, still unfolding and needed verification.

There were many unknowns in the hours after the attack, but I knew what I could bank on – the AFP responding with muscle memory, with purpose and without hesitation, and working closely with our domestic, Commonwealth and international partners.

When I landed in Australia, I held relevant security briefings and updates with the Prime Minister, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke, NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon the AFP’s Counter Terrorism and Special Investigations Command and senior members of the Jewish community.

Over the coming days my immediate team and I relocated to the AFP’s Sydney office, in part to be closer to our NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team, which includes the AFP, ASIO, NSW Police and the NSW Crime Commission.

On December 16, in Sydney with Commonwealth and state representatives, I made my first public comments on the attack.

I want to read you a few paragraphs of those remarks because they give a sense of the main message I wanted Australians to take from me as AFP Commissioner.

I didn’t mince words. I wanted Australians to know I would be vulnerable with them in their grief, yet that they could count on me as Commissioner and the AFP to be strong, focussed and have the clarity and expertise when it came to discharging our duties for the enormous job ahead.

I said:

This was a barbaric attack against Jewish Australians.

On Sunday, Jewish Australians were hunted down in broad day light at an Australian iconic beach.

The suspected murderers, callous in their coordination, appear to have had no regard for the age or ableness of their victims. It appears the alleged killers were more interested in a quest for a death tally.

Like October 7, 2023, we will not forget how that shocking attack forced Jews around the world to re-live modern-day terror that should have been consigned to the history books decades ago.

In Australia, the AFP will also never forget the date of December 14 – and what it means for a community that deserves to live in peace and harmony.

Now we understand words and information are important for context and comfort. However, we are very much focused on action, including conducting a thorough investigation.

This investigation will be highly-visible, precise and will operate round the clock.

The NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team investigation will leverage all unique powers, capabilities and international networks.

Since December, we have worked in partnership with the NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team to investigate the attack at Bondi and we are now supporting the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions through the prosecution phase. 

Many have asked me how I felt about the Bondi attack happening so early on my Commissionership.

And it is an easy answer. My previous role as AFP Deputy Commissioner National Security held me in very good stead.

The contemporary intelligence, system processes and threat assessments remained fresh in my mind, and importantly, I still maintained trusted partnerships with many in the Jewish community. 

I also believed we were organisationally positioned in the most advantageous way to contribute to the multi-jurisdictional investigation because of the reforms I introduced when I became Commissioner in October 2025.

Those reforms included shifting the AFP to a national security agency that would focus on high harm, high value targets impacting on Australia.

I did this because of the terrorism operating environment and the growing threat and unpredictability of criminal convergences.

I also introduced five new priorities for the AFP, including;

• Defending Australia's domestic security and our region
• Supercharging global operations
• Future proofing our workforce
• Investing in science and technology-led capability, and
• Protecting vulnerable communities.

My first public announcement in October was the formation of new National Security Investigations teams to target groups and individuals causing high harm to our community cohesion. I did this because I was growing more concerned about Australia’s degrading security environment.

Essentially, the National Security Investigations Teams are a flying squad of hate disrupters who focus on high-harm, high-impact politically motivated violence, communal violence and hate crimes that do not meet the threshold for terrorism investigations but drive fear and division.

This is all about stopping hate and division earlier – and well before it leads to violence.

As of 5 August 2026, the teams have charged 56 individuals with Commonwealth offences.

Of these 56 individuals:

• 38 individuals have been charged for offences relating to threats against parliamentarians and high office holders
• 29 individuals have been charged with using of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence
• 10 individuals have been charged with using a carriage service to make a threat, and
• 3 individuals have been charged with threatening to cause harm to a Commonwealth public official.

These charges and our investigations will not be a surprise to many of you in this room.

Our social harmony is fraying, many people are angry and willing to express it, and conspiracy theories and a further distrust in traditional institutions is contributing to mis and disinformation.

Add the complexity of social media, and we have one of the greatest challenges we are facing – and that is disengaged, confused, resentful and violent young people.

It is also coming at a time when many protective factors are eroding or are not there at all.

When I talk about protective factors, its support like family, sport, school, faith leaders, teachers – all the reinforcements that cocoon our young people from harm.

Often, when the AFP charge young people for serious crimes, it is because one or more of these protective factors are missing.

For example, these young people may refuse to attend school, they may live in a dysfunctional home, or they may no longer have good role models.

However, that is not always the case, and some young people, impressionable and curious, are just being manipulated, and a lot of the time via social media.

Many youth want answers about contentious or polarising issues. So instead of asking a parent, teacher or coach, they look for answers online and are often siphoned to sites that peddle mis and disinformation, or to chat groups or platforms that are violent, racist or are misogynist.

From 2020 to 12 August 2026, there have been, 65 youths, aged between 12-17 years, who have been investigated for serious crimes by Joint Counter Terrorism Teams across the country.

Thirty-five of those youths have been charged with one or more Commonwealth terrorism-related offence. 

Of the 65 youths investigated, 45 per cent identified as being religiously motivated, 25 per cent as ideologically motivated, 14 per cent had a mixed ideology and 1per cent had an unclear ideology, and 15 per cent are still yet to be determined. ​ 

Almost all the youth identified in the case load displayed early indicators of radicalisation to parents, educators or to healthcare professionals.  

If it used to take a village to raise a child, because of advances in technology, it now takes a country to keep them safe.

This is not a problem law enforcement can do on its own. This requires a whole-of-society effort.

Another serious and complex threat that is challenging law enforcement across the world relates to crime and violence as a service.

Just like the many industries disrupted by the gig economy, so too has the criminal business model.

For many criminals, and in some cases, state actors, it is now faster and cheaper to task out a criminal act rather than doing it themselves.

Some organised crime members or low-level criminals take on this new line of criminal work for money.

And some are recruiting young people on social media or on gaming platforms to carry out crimes on behalf of others.

For some kids these days, their after school job is not working for McDonald’s but being on the payroll crime gangs.

Arsons, bashings, illicit drug trafficking – some of these youths are being paid to commit very serious crimes.

And in some cases, young people have been linked to crimes connected to national security investigations like politically motivated violence.

I want to provide a more context about this issue because it will give you a sense of how complicated it is to investigate some of these crimes.

Criminal motivation is becoming very opaque. That means there is not always a straight line from criminal to criminal act.

We are witnessing criminal amoebas that constantly change shape, split and merge with other criminal networks when it is in their interest.

But their adaption is not just because of tech – although tech is a significant enabler.

It is because of the collision and collusion between two groups that previously undertook very separate lines of criminality given their differing motivations.

Terrorists, state actors and state officials, often motivated by power and political destabilisation, are responsible for terrorism attacks, foreign interference, espionage and cyber warfare.

Organised criminals, who often align themselves to outlaw motorcycle gangs, traffickers of illicit commodities, money launderers and muscle for hire, are generally motivated by profit.

Their acts of criminality were so separate that many police forces around world had investigators that either focussed on national security or organised crime - and rarely did they share criminal persons of interest. 

But increasingly, in Europe, and Five Eyes countries, including in Australia, persons of interest in organised crime matters are being linked to state actors or their proxies.

Law enforcement agencies around the world are uncovering examples where state actors have turned traditional organised crime networks to grey zone offending. 

In effect, state actors are increasingly capitalising on existing criminal underworld connections, especially with those who share ethnicity or ideology, to carry out offences such as foreign interference, sabotage or terrorism.

This crime convergence is in part the product of recent asymmetrical warfare, the growing costs of conflicts around the world, challenges to the rules-based order and good old-fashioned opportunism.

Our diabolical reality, particularly in Western countries, is that individual offenders or networks are now willing to carry out serious crimes for despots, dictators and disrupters.

Power and profit are colliding and colluding with politics.

State actors, officials and their proxies are using criminal networks for three main purposes: 

1. Criminal networks are all over the world and are willing to break the law.

2. It gives state actors and other officials plausible deniability when an offence is committed.

And 3. For state actors, it is cheaper and lower risk to task a criminal network than training and investing in an operative to carry out every single action, especially those designed to destabilise a country’s sovereignty or national security.

Crime convergence and the blurring of motivations is becoming more challenging for law enforcement to identify, and it also has the potential to confuse and instil fear in the public.

That means we must investigate crime through a different lens. We must look deeper. 

For example, offences primarily investigated by state and territory law enforcement agencies, like vandalism, arson, or break-ins at homes, businesses or institutions, may not be clear-cut as they seem.

There are many overseas examples where these types of offences have been carried out by organised crime, on behalf of state actors, to target diaspora, harass political dissidents, steal IP from institutions or fuel political unrest.

The growing number of these cases overseas, and many more serious offences linked to criminal convergence, is a warning sign for our nation. 

The playbook of some state actors has already been used in Australia.

It means the AFP must remain agile and use and create new technology with reliable partners and industry.

It can be harder for law enforcement to use technology as quick as criminals, because they do not need legislation or privacy assessments and they certainly are not subject to oversight bodies.

And that is a challenge because terrorists and hatemongers are manipulating vulnerable and susceptible individuals at rapid speed by using existing and emerging technology.

It used to take months or years to radicalise an individual, but now, in some cases, it is happening within days. Because of AI, the scale and pace of manipulation is at levels we have never seen.

To help counter this threat, the Commonwealth Government recently announced the Counter Terrorism Online Centre to allow ASIO and the AFP to identify, target and disrupt credible threats, which will be triaged and coordinated for action.

We need to use a combination of human intelligence and artificial intelligence to disrupt and detect the extremist recruiters and inciters, while protecting and diverting those at risk.

The new capability will also provide an early warning system for the nation’s Joint Counter Terrorism Teams about emerging hate groups and individuals who use social media, gaming platforms, online forums and our dark web to incite or commit violence.

In the meantime, I continue to have meaningful conversations with tech companies in Australia and overseas.

Responsible tech companies can be the digital penicillin of our time.

The AFP has a very wide complex and complicated remit. We investigate online child exploitation, Commonwealth fraud, the trafficking of illicit commodities, forced marriage, cyber crime, terrorism, espionage and foreign interference.

Our role also includes protecting high office holders, Federal Parliamentarians, designated airports and key defence sites; and right now we are building a new Command to protect the planned arrival of AUKUS submarines.

But just about every crime we investigate or disrupt is tech enabled, which means our technology, capability and partnerships must be among our greatest tools. 

How we use technology and when we deploy it, could also change what success may look like to the public, stakeholders and our partners.

One of the AFP’s most powerful levers will always be to arrest and charge – and where it is most operationally viable, we will do this every day of the week.

However, in our complex and complicated operating environment, one of the fastest, safest and most efficient ways to protect Australia against some crimes will be to disrupt and frustrate criminals much earlier.

That means acting quicker, even if it means we can’t arrest, intervening on lower-level crimes before they become more serious and using civil action such as our legislation to target unlawful, criminal profits.

I will take more time explaining this to the public and key stakeholders in the months ahead, because at the heart of this pivot is the evolution of crime and the policing response required.

It is also important for me to explain that while the AFP may appear silent on some criminal issues or momentarily withhold public information on matters of public importance, that should not be viewed as inaction or arrogance.

The words we use publicly or in the media serves more than one purpose – they are not just to provide updates, but they are generally leveraged to gain an operational outcome. We know criminals listen to what we say – often they just don’t know we are listening.

Our number one priority is always keeping the community safe – and we will use all our tools to do it – include our public messaging.

However, I do acknowledge that it is crucial that the AFP makes itself available to connect to the community we serve.

That’s why as Commissioner, I try to attend forums like this as much as possible.

And when I do, I will speak plain English and not sugar coat the threats we are facing as a country.

Australia’s security environment will remain volatile and unpredictable for some time.

Agencies like the AFP will leave nothing on the table when it comes to upholding our mission and protecting our country and our region.

But we will also be asking business, academia, faith leaders and other community members to work more closely with the AFP.

It goes to the theme of today’s breakfast: Security is everyone’s business.

I could not agree more.

The AFP needs to be bold, adventurous, take good risks and identify new public and private partnerships.

We must be better at connecting with the communities we serve, and with those who may have the solutions to some of our intractable policing challenges.

For the past few months, I have been expressing the need for continued service to country. 

I am proud, and frankly relieved that generations continue to join the AFP, the Australian Defence Force and other national security and law enforcement agencies.

And while I accept wearing a uniform is not for everyone, all citizens can play a role in contributing to Australia's national security and protecting our future.

The CSG does this every day – and I wonder about others in this room today. If you have not thought about working for the AFP, have you thought about working with the AFP?

Australia’s security, our way of life and our future – our kids – are all at stake.

If you have ideas, the AFP wants to hear them.

If you want to contribute, the AFP wants to hear how we can work together.

Because at the end of the day, this is your AFP – we work for you to help keep Australia safe.

Thank you.